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l . / INTRODUCTION.
According to the European Directive (l) related to the
prevention of major technological hazards, a lot of individual
hazards investigations wore performed for oil, liquefled gas,
chemicals, grain, fertilizers plants and storages.
Individual hazards investigation are generally carried out for
each individual facility and, according to French regulations
(2) , three different reports might be issued :
- a survey of thc hazards (Etüde des dangers) to emphasize the
main hazards in the facility and preventive and protective
measures,
- an Infernal Operation Programme (Plan d'Operation Interne -
POI -) with the aim of organizing fire fighting and other
safety measures,
- in some cases, administrative authorities may ask a third
party for a critical survey (etude de sdrete ou analyse
critique de l'etude de dangers) of the hazards and related
infernal Operation Programme issued under the responsibility
of the plant's owner.
In addition, general survey of an industrial estate is
sometimes required by the administrative authorities.
The authors were personnally involved in some of these
individual and general actions äs well äs in accident
investigations.
In the first part of this. gaper, acceptable pressure and heat
radiation thresholds and-energy thresholds for missile effect
have been choosen for the scenarios of major technological
hazards such äs fires and explosions, The effects on the
Population and on the facilities are critically analysed and
emphasis on energy thresholds- for fragment dispersion will be
given when presenting means of assessing the effects.
The three following parts will be devoted respectively to
caiculatlon means used for evaluation of the effects Of pool
fires, bleve and explosions (both confined and unconfined).
Observations drawn from the Investigations of accidents will
be critically reviewed.
International Conference and Workshop on Modeling and Mitigating
Consequences of Accident Release of Hazardous Materials, Hartford,
20-24 mal 1991, pp. 563-84.
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II./ PRESSURE ftNP HEAT RflDIRTION THRESHOLDS flND ENERGY
THRESHOLDS FOR MISSILE EFFECT.
11.1. Pressure effects.
II.l.l. Effects on individuais.
After a dose examination of existing dafa the followino
threshold values for human being were accepted :
'••-' 170 mbar, threshold for a significant lethality,
- 50 mbar, under this threshold, pressure effects on man are
reversible.
The levels are consistent with the values fixed In French
regulation related to safety distances In pyrotechnic plants
(3) when using the pressure versus the scaled distance curves
determined with trinitrotoluene detonations äs exemplified in
table l.
Table l
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r (m) : radius from the center of the explosion
m(kg) : welght of TNT involved
These thresholds values are defined in terras of Incident
pressure. We do know this is an over-estimation for small
explosions (for instance 100 kg TNT equivalent).
In fact, time has to be considered : the Impulse effects have
an important influence on men and facilities. For men, two
types of effects are in fact to be examined :
- injuries to eardrums and lungs
- people set in motlon by the shock wave.
It is well known that eardrums do not withstand a rapid rise
in pressure. Time is a parameter to be taken into account by
the means of Impulse. Transient effects may appear when
surpression exceeds 0.015 bar, if positive Impulse -I- is over
0.02 bar. ms. Eardrums may be ruptured with a surpression up to
0.35 bar and an Impulse over 0.5 bar.ms.
3 -
tin-cahold l'or pulmonary in.liiries
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Figure l : Physiological effects of pressure
(private conununication)
A sudden overpressure on the thorax may easily cause pulmonary
injuries. Importance of the disease is an increasing function
of the ratio P/Patm (overpressure/atmopheric pressure)- and of
the ratio I/M1/^ Patm1/^ äs exemplified on figure l 'where I
is the positive Impulse and M the weight of the individual.
But people may also be set in motion by the shock wave. The
initial speed is function of the overpressure P, and of
I/M^/3. When this speed is less than 3 m/s, there is no
particular risk. By collision of the head against a pari of a
fixed Installation, a fracture of the skull may happen when
this speed is 4 m/s ; it will happen quite surely when the
speed is 7 m/s and with 50 % probability when speed is 5.5
m/s. By collision of an other part of the body than the head
the corresponding values for speed are 6.4, 42 and 16.5 m/S.
11.1.2. Effects on structures.
Data are available about the behaviour of walls structural
equipment and window panes (23). Structural equipment design
may include layout and devices to limit explosion damage.
Nevertheless the analyst has to bear in mind the synergetic
effects a blast wave may produce on the surrounding
equipments- Only few informations is avalable for instance in
an existing plant, the main difficulty lying in the lack of
data for previous designs.
As regards the pressure effect on facilities, TNT curves (4)
glve the incident peak overpressures versus scaled
distances . But the effects of reflections are to be
considered ; these curves are consistent for explosives and
mainly in the far fields. For detonation of gases (5),
evaluation tests are summarized on figure 2.
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Figure 2 : Detonation peak overpressure of unconfined
air-hydrocarbon mixtures (spherical geoinetry)
[from A. Lannoy (5)]
'Two extreme cases are possible :
- unconfined explosions are mostly deflagrations the flame
speeds of which are mainly variable in relationship with
ignitlon sources (6) and geometry of the confinement.
However, in some cases, transition from deflagration to
detonation may occur (7) (B),
- bursting of vessels in relationship with production of
missiles.
Currently, only scattered results are known (5) and
experimental investigations to validate physical modeis are
needed.
11.2. Heat radiation thresholds from fires and bleve.
11.2.1. Effect on individuais.
For the survey of hazards the following thresholds are
generally considered when the duration of the fire is quite
high (more than 60 s). :
- 0.52 W/cm2, for severe casualties and lethality,
- 0.29 W/cm2, under this threshold, the radiation eftect on
man is reversible.
These thresholds are to be used only when men are unable to
escape and run away from heat effects.
Nevertheless, when people is properly drilled, higher values
could be accepted (for instance : 0.8 W/cm2 for firemen with
suitable equipment and a quite short stay).
For long duration effects, it is possible to quote
correlations giving the threshold value of injury (at a low
probability) and lethality äs a function of time (9).
In the case of Bleve, the phenomenon is very quick and higher
threshold values, function of time, are thus to be used. For
l % fatality level, the threshold flux :
0 = 190.81 t-0.771
(0 kW/m2 and t s) is given on figure 3 according to EISENBERG
values quoted by MUDAN (9). Currently, one may assess that the
duration of a Bleve is in the order of 20-30s for spheres
containing 500 m3 to 1500 m3 of liquefied gas.
Sometimes, this threshold is presented in term of dose
(joules). It must be said, that in this case, this flux 0 and
time t are connected by the following formula (0 * t =
constant) but this relation is no mors valid when t is higher
than 10 s.
Figure 3 [From MUDAN (9)]
11.2.2. Effects on facilities.
As regards the heat radiation effects on facilities, various
cases are to be taken into account. Thus, threshold values
cannot be easily and univocally given. Many caiculations are
possible when the behaviour of the material in presence of
fire is known. For example LANNOY (10) deals with heat
conduction in concrete. But spacing distances derived from
thermal radiation modeis are also needed. They are for
instance given by CROCKER and NAPIER (11) in table 2.
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major conscqucnccs for thc plant.
11.3. Explosion energy thresholds for missile effect.
11.3.1. Energy throsholds.
For individuais, tlic only importoni: energy thrcshold for
missiles cfJEcct is thc onc corrcsponding to Icthality. It is
no worth worrying about dcfining a rcversibility thrcshold for
wlicn o missile pcnotrates any pari of thc body.
The frcnch pyrotcciinic rcgulation givcs this lethality
thrcshold os equal to 20 Joules. This valuc is connected to
thc boundary botwcen zonc Z^  (dcfined by "serious and may be
lothai injuries") and zonc 23 (dcfined by "injurics") (sco
fable l).
'' "^ "' fWhon an explosion occurs, thc impulsc J pdt which sets the
fragmcnts in motion is of paramount influcnce.
One has to bear in mind two diffcrcnt approaches :
- the first one related to "small fragments". In -fchis case,
the spatial distribution is of first importance and the
question to deal with is about possible penetration in the
human body,
- the second pertalning to "important f^agments" where the
Penetration does not matter, but wher'e the iroportance is
-given to injuries by percussion of the skull. The skull may
be fractured (at a low probability level) when hit by a
missile the speed of which is greater than 4 m/s.
The first of these approaches is valid for some anununitions.
In industry, for the vast majority of accidental explosions
experience proved that the mean weight of a fragment is of the
order of 30 to 100 kg. When the fragment has a 10-15 kg weight
and a 4 m/s speed, its cinetic energy is 80-120 Joules. Thus
we have choosen an energy threshold equal to 100 Joules.
11.3.2. Missile effects.
For the prediction of the missile effect during accidental
explosions, simple caiculation methods were defined in TNO
yellow book (18). They were completed in the UCSIP (Union des
Chainbres Syndicales de l'Industrie du petrole) guide for
hazard .evaluation in the petroleum industry (17).
This approach can be summarized in the three following Steps :
- energetic caiculation of the initial speed of a fragment,
- ballistic caiculation with possible consideration of a drag
coefficient,
- comparison of the ballistic results to lethal energy
thresholds for individuais and to impact Perforation speeds
for pieces of equipment.
Even though, complex softwares have been developped ; until
now the mechanisms of bursting for different types of material
and vessel shapes was only validated for simple configurations
and mainly metallic materials under dynamic loading frorn an
explosion.
Therefore the first main difficulty is to define the bursting
pressure of the vessel, the location where the initial
breaking occurs and the number and shapes of the missiles.
Then during the projection, the direction i s strongly
dependent on the shape and mass of the missiles.
Keeping in mind all these remarks, the following formulas are
applled to the missile :
- for the initial speed VMIS (m/s) with a fragile rupture of a
vessel of volume V (m3) and mass M under a pressure P
(pascal),
VMIS = 0.97 f^Pyl0-5L " J
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- for the maximum height Z^ (m)
Z i = VMIS^in^/Zg (with «•(, angle for the projection)
- for the landing distance from the vessel (m)
X2 = VMIsZsin2 °< /g
These last two formulas do not consider the drag coefficients
and some results for different vessel volumes under 3 x 104
pascal pressure with the assumption of °< = 45 are given for a
mass of the niissile of 100 kg in table 3.
The influence of the drag coefficient DRAG «= k a/nl/3 on
landing distance X2 (k : empirical constant : 0.0014 m~l kg~
1/3 for a subsonic missile with a between 1.5 and 2) is
emphasized on last colunin of table 3 for x^ Drag.
Table 3
V
(m3)
1630
2900
3650
4500
6530
11600
14570
57600
VMIS
(m/s)
35.6
36.5
38.2
38.8
39.7
40.5
40.6
43.5
Zi(m)
32
34
37
38
40
42
42
48
X2
(m)
129
136
149
154
161
167
168
192
X2*
(m)
138
144
156
161
166
173
174
198,6
X2 is caiculated assuming the missile is ejected
from ground levei
* KZ drag is caiculated assuming the missile is
ejected from the top of the vessel
Such assumptions are consistent with observatlons made for
example in San Jüan Ixhuatepec accident (15).
But, for apparatus of complex shapes and buildings,
directional'ieffects and the exact location of the weakest part
of the System combined with the propagation mechanism of the
explosion imply great uncertaintles about the maximum landing
distance for the missile and its random distribution.
Therefore, we have more confidence about the results gained by
investigating accidental explosions and simple caiculations
are sufficient for prevision purposes in hazard studies (see
V.2).
in./ POOL FIRES.
The main purpose is to assess the
For this, three parameters are
burning rate, flame height, amount
fire.
radius of the effect (r).
successively caiculated :
of heat radiated from the
III.l. Burning rate.
The burning rate values are either published in the literature
(22) or caiculated using correlations. The first of them is
given by Burgess and Zabetakis :
Ymax = 1-27 x 10-6 A^c („/s)
A Hv
where Ymax is e^ rate at which the liquid pool level
decreases with time in the absence of external supply. & Hn
and & Hy are respectively the net heat of combustion and the
heat of vaporization (in J/kg) at the bolling point of the
liquid fuel. For usual liquid hydrocarbons ymax ^  l" the
ränge 2-4 mm/min.
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Then, the burning rate m (kg/m2.s) may be written :
m = y/>
with (kg/m3) specific mass of the fuel.
Äccording to Mudan (9) this way of assessing the mass burning
rate underestimates the value for liquefied gases by almost a
factor of two. In this case, the correlation for the mass
burning rate may be preferably written :
m" = l0-3 AHc (kg/m2, s)
.^Hv*
where A "v* = A Hy + /.
Tb
TO
Cp (T ) dt
if the boiling temperature is under the ambient, one has to
consider A ny* -AHy.
For LPG, theorical assumptions and experiments led to the
value m" = 0.11 kg/m2.s.
'111.2. Flami^ Jleight.
The flame height - h - 1s caiculated using Thomas's formula
with equivalent diameter or the correlation given by HESKESTAD
(12 ) for a C*t Hß 0^ molecule. THOMAS gives :
h/D 42 l 0.61
P : specific mass of air (kg/m3)
D : equivalent diameter (m)
g : acceleration of gravity (m/s2)
m" : äs previously defined (kg/m2.s)
111.3. Heat radiated from the fire.
For LPG, we have considered an emissive power of 60 kW/m2
according to MIZNER and EYRE (22) to be compared to 30 kW/m2
for liquid hydrocarbons).
From this thermal radiated flux one can caiculate the flux
received considering view factor and attenuation through air.
The table 4 gives caiculations of the radil for different heat
radiation thresholds with 20 and 30 m long square pools.
As previously mentioned these first type caiculations are
conservative and other parameters such äs the geometry of the
dyke, screen effect of construction, view factors are to be
taken into account if more accuracy is needed.
Table 4
Radius from the edge of the pool at
different heat radiation thresholds - L - (m)
:Jlll^;l„'llH':U
L,,'^,!
l.y<;;-o-
c.'irltoii;;
- L - (m ) | - L - (m )
O.S2 W/cm 2 0 .20 W/cm 2
20 m long sq'iarc pool
'-in l • /(>
l
35 | /17
l
- L - ( i n ) | - L - ( i n )
0.52 W/cni2 0.20 U/cm2
30 m long square pool
00 | 10<i
l
10 | - 6 5
l
The influence of the wind could be also of paramount
importance leading to the tilt and the drag of the flame.
Then, the radiative effect may be caiculated from a tllted
cylinder in the wind direction. The area involved takes an
elllptical shape. Even, the longest dimenslon is only 25 %
higher than the previously caiculated radius. But, the
convective effect may become predominant.
Nevertheless, the tilting angle and the flame length are
usefui to determine the pieces of equipment engulfed in fires.
IV./ BLEVE.
This phenomenon, by its thermal effects, . can trigger the most
important major technological hazards. Comparisons between
thermal and pressure effects are given.
For examples, for propane or butane spheres (the volume of
which ränge from 500 to 1500 m3) the following caiculations
can be made.
IV.l. Thermal effects of Bleve.
We have considered the existing empirical correlations giving
the radius and the duration of the fire ball and its radiation
and compared these caiculations.
According to NAZARIO (14) the duration of the fire ball in
seconds is caiculated by :
t = 0.45.MO-333
Where M (kg) is the quantity of LPG in the fire ball typically
taken äs the maximum content of the vessel.
The radiation from the fire ball can be estimated by :
qf = (0.176.R. LHV. M2/3) / L2
where :
: qf is in W/m2
: R is the radiative fraction of combustion energy taken äs
0.3 if the bursting pressure is less than the set
pressure of the pressure relief valve or 0.4 if the
bursting pressure is greater than the pressure relief
valve set point
: LHV is the net heat of combustion for the materlal (J/kg)
: L (m) is the distance from the center of the fireball
' : M (kg) is the content of the vessel
TNO (18) proposes to caiculate the duration of the fire ball
and its radius using the formula :
duration (seconds) t = 0.852 MO•26
radius (m) = 3.24 nO-325
M (kg) äs previously defined
Assuming the heat radiation on the surface of the ball 1s
200 kW/m2, and using the threshold curves reported by K. S
MUDAN (9) about- fatality levels for thermal radiation, it is
possible to caiculate :
radius (m) for l % lethallty =3.12 M0-425
radius (m) for significant burns =4.71 M0-407
These radii are caiculated at ground level, without
attenuation by air. 11 would be possible to consider the
height the ball reaches in the atmosphere. According to LIHOU
and MAUND (16) this height 1s equal to 10t*. In fact, the
correction it introduces is included in these oversimplified
hypotheses, the main unknown data being the heat radiation on
the surface of the ball.
- 10 -
According to UCSIP (17), the radius of the fireball may be
caiculated by :
radius (m) of the fire ball = 2 M1/3
radius (m) for lethality = 7.182 M1/3
radius (m) for significant burns = 10.157 M1/3
BAKER, COX, WESTINE, KULESZ and STREHLOW (4) have developped a
means of assessing the diameter and the duratlon of the
fireball, using adimensional numbers :
diameter (in) of the fireball = 3.86 x 1.387 x MO-32
(where 1.387 = (1350/3600)-1/3 is due to the influence of
temperature)
duration (s) of the fireball ° 0.299 x 26.29 M°-32
(where 26.29 = (3600/1350)10/3 is due to the temperature)
and radius (m) for unbearable pain = 8.59 H1/3
*t : duration of fireball
Wo havc coliiparcd Lhc rcsults rjivcn by tlic^o formula in table
5.
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When comparing these results, it is evident that there are
large discrepancles (mainly related to the values of emissive
powers, the position of the fireball, the attenuation by air).
Very likely, these evaluations by STREHLOW on one hand and by
others on the otlier hand cannot be compared. Nevertheless, the
use of adimensional groupation is interesting.
Until now we propose the use of TNO formula (18).
IV. 2. Pressure effects of -the Bleve.
According to TNO Yellow book (18) the peak overpressure of a
shock wave with adiabatic flash for hydrocarbons is related to
the scaled distance r/(2M)0.33 with the parameter
"superheating" (liquid temperature of the contents of the
vessel just before bursting open - the atmospheric boiling
points of the liquid).
Assuming an overheating of 150 K, it is possible to caiculate
the radii for pressure thresholds of 170 mbar and 50 mbar.
radius (m) for lethality (at a tew % probability pressure
threshold = 170 mbar) = 3.84 (M)1/3
radius (m) for reversible wounds (pressure threshold =
50 mbar) » 8.70 (M)1/3
For example for a 1500 m3 butane sphere, the radius for
significant burns, given in the above mentioned table, is
1162 m while the radius for reversible injuries (pressure
threshold 50 mbar), caiculated by the above formula is 792 m.
It can be concluded that the pressure effects radli are lower
than those for heat radiation. Consequently, for the
protection of •the population, (if we do not consider the
missile effect), one need to consider mainly the radiation
effects. But it might be pointed out that, until now, the
delay of occurrence of a BLEVE is quite unpredictable.
V./ CONFINED AND UNCONFINED EXPLOSIONS.
Accidental explosions may be either confined or unconfined
with hazardous substances äs diverse äs explosives,
propellants, fertilizers, combustible gases and vapors and
flammable dusts.
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V.l. Unconfined explosions.
With gases and vapors, DAVEMPORT (19) pointed out that only a
small part of the released gas 1s generally involved in the
explosion.
Such an explosion occurred sonie years ago in France in a
chemical plant after the accidental release from a vessel
under 40 bar pressure ; 160 kg of a-'Tntxture on H^-CH^ (H2/CH4
3) were relaased, after the breakage of a connecting duct äs a
guillotine opening. In this particular case, froni the effect
given by the blast wave and the mechanical damages it may be
concluded that only l kg of H2-CH4 mixture (out of an amount
of 160 kg released) was Involved in the explosion. After dose
examination of the mechanical damages, the TNT equivalent
could be assumed äs 5 kg. In these particular conditions,
only the turbulence was responsible of the mixing process
before this explosion. The ignition source was unknown but the
ignition occurred a few seconds after the release.
In the survey of the hazards for assuming the maximum effects
of the explosion, the time lag at which'the Initiation of the
explosion occurred is äs important äs the source location in
order to define the safety distances. Unfortunately, a few
Codes can describe the generation of a cloud, particularly
when it results from the discharge in air of a vessel
pressurized by a flanunable gas. We established a code
describing the Variation with time of the dimenslons of the
flammable cloud and validated it by testing the horizontal
discharge in air of a 120 dffl3 vessel pressurized by 10 MPa of
H2 or CH4 through a hole of dianieter d(6<d<24 mm). Finally it
was concluded that the volume of the zone, where the air-gas
mixture is flammable, is characterized by an increasing phase
followed by a decreasing phase ; the proflle of the
concentration versus distance curve (fig. 4) is hyperbolic äs
in a stationary jet . Caiculated (JET l code) and experimental
values for the distance at which the lower flanunabllity limit
-xLFL- is obtained 1s given in fable 6 (20). An example of the
caiculated xLFL contour can be seen on figure 5.
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Figure 4
The JET l code is able to caiculate the volume of the
flammable mixture in the decreasing phase in the choosen
operating conditions. At the moment, tests with higher values
of the vessel volume and of the hole diameter would be
necessary to have longer increasing phases and to predict the
instant of the transition between the two phases when the
flammable volume is a t its maximum. Nevertheless this volume
remains very low (5 to 10 % of the initial amount of flammable
gas).
But explosions are also possible in confined spaces.
V.2. Confined explosions.
For example, in 1986 in a casting line, a very violent
aluminum explosion occurred causing the- death of 4 people,
injuring 25 others and with extensive material damage.
Lightning was recognized äs the initial factor of the
explosion. A modest amount of the lightning energy was
involved in the Vaporisation and atomisation process of liquid
aluminum. The resulting vapors and droplets, mixed with air
ignited by the lightning, gave an explosion of and above the
casting line (ground level). Then, a second explosion, not äs
powerfui äs the first one was initiated in the casting pit by
the action of liquid aluminum on water. By examination of the
damages to the casting pit and to the surrounding buildings,
evidence was gained that the TNT equivalent was about 200 kg
and 100 kg respectively for the first and second explosions.
Pieces of equipment of the casting line were thrown up to
700 m äs examplified on figure 6. This figure shows the
asymetrical projection of debris with some screening effects
given by the foundry equipment located westwards from the
center of the explosion. This projection field is hardly
caiculable.
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Figure 6
Aluminum explosion : projection field of 52 missiles (x)
(mean weight : 62 kg, maximum landing distance : 600 m)
Every year, a lot of accidental dust explosions occurred in
elevator buildings and silos. Damages can be more or less
extensive but in some cases, when the confinement 1s
important, with rather resistant concrete buldings, concrete
missiles must be thrown. In 1982 a barley and malt dust
explosion occurred in Metz, France and induced the collapse of
nine out of 14 concrete cells (äs a consequence of the fact
that there was quite no links between the cells -independent
cells-). A violent explosion in the work tower resulted in a
shock wave with the projection of lightweight panels blown in
a verydirectional area (no more than 100 m). The disperslon of
very important concrete blocks was not larger than 80 m
corresponding to the maximal height of the elevator.
The same year, another explosion was initiated in the upper
part of a sugar storage plant (2 x 20 000 t cells and l x
40 000 t cell).
The two 20 000 t cells were covered •with an expanded concrete
roof and during the explosion,, guite small pieces were thrown'
up to a distance of 500 m, but the vertical walls remalned
Standing even though "some crevices appeared. For the largest
cell (40 000 t) the reinforced concrete roof first was raised
up with some dismantH.ng In large pleces but then feil agnin
into the silo cell.
With these examples of explosions, 1t became evident that
there is a lack of validated methods to predict the effects of
such accidents. Efforts must be devoted to validating the
existing modeis or to improving them.
VI./ CONCHJSION. •••-.•'- -•
The critical' analysis of hazards studies and accident
connected to pool fires, BLEVES and confined and unconflned
explosions pointed out many lacks of Information to evaluate
the pressure, heat and missile effects.
The acceptable pressure and heat radiation thresholds and the
energy thresholds for missile effects are generally based on
experience gained after accident investigation or intentional
explosions.
The effects on individuais and facilities are both to be
considered separately.
For pressure thresholds, the effects on human beings are quite
well understood ; but for facilities, only scattered data are
avallable. Validations by experiments with existing physical
modeis are needed with dose examination of the effect of
reflected pressures and of small TNT charges (less than
100 kg).
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Heat radiation thresholds are to be choosen differently
whether Bleves or large pool fires are involved.
As an energy threshold for missile effect, values between
20 joules (used in pyrotechnic plants) and 100 joules (related
to observations after accidental explosions) are likely.
For the maximum landing distances of missiles energetic and
simple ballistic caiculations gave an order of magnitude for
bursting of vessels. In other cases only results galned from
accident investigatlons are useful.
As regards pool fires, caiculation means are consistent to
evaluate the heat radiated from LPG and liquid hydrocarbona
fires. The effect of convection needs more consideration.
For Eleve, current caiculations are sufficient for predictive
purposes but the delay of occurrence is strongly influenced by
the type of equipment and preventive means (insulation,
external water, steam or foam spraying) and rather
unpredictable.
More experimental investigations for both confined and
unconfined explosions are needed to get a better understanding
of the mechanisms of the explosion, and of the behavior of
eguipment and buildings under dynamic loads glven by these
explosions.
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